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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose a new practical identity-based
encryption scheme which is suitable for wireless sensor net-
work (WSN). We call it Receiver-Bounded Online/Oine
Identity-based Encryption (RB-OOIBE). It splits the en-
cryption process into two parts { the oine and the on-
line part. In the oine part, all heavy computations are
done without the knowledge of the receiver's identity and
the plaintext message. In the online stage, only light com-
putations such as modular operation and symmetric key en-
cryption are required, together with the receiver's identity
and the plaintext message. Moreover, since each oine ci-
phertext can be re-used for the same receiver, the number
of oine ciphertexts the encrypter holds only connes the
number of receivers instead of the number of messages to be
encrypted. In this way, a sensor node (with limited computa-
tion power and limited storage) in WSN can send encrypted
data easily: A few oine ciphertexts can be computed in the
manufacturing stage while the online part is light enough for
the sensor to process.
We propose an ecient construction for this new no-
tion. The scheme can be proven selective-ID CCA secure
in the standard model. Compared to previous online/oine
identity-based encryption schemes, our scheme is exempt
from a high storage requirement, which is proportional to
the number of messages to be sent. The improvement is
very signicant if many messages are sent to few receivers.
1. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a wireless network com-
posed of a large number of sensor nodes. In WSNs the
This is the full version of [7]
scarcest resource is energy. For this reason, algorithmic re-
search in WSN mostly focuses on the study and design of en-
ergy aware algorithms for data computation. This problem
becomes harder in the case of security, as most of the security
algorithms are quite heavy. Although symmetric cryptogra-
phy maybe one of the approaches to solve the problem due to
their small computation requirement, key distribution mat-
ter becomes another side eect. Recently, researchers are
trying to apply assymmetric cryptography into WSN envi-
ronment. Solutions include using online/oine algorithms
and stateful public key encryption schemes.
Online/Offline algorithm.\Online/oine"cryptographic
algorithm was rst introduced by Even, Goldreich and Mi-
cali [8], in the context of digital signature. Under this paradigm,
the signing process can be divided into two phases. The
rst phase is called oine phase which is executed prior to
the arrival of a message and the second phase is called on-
line phase which is performed after knowing the message.
The online phase should be very fast and require only very
light computation, such as integer multiplication or hashing.
Other heavier computation such as exponentiation should
be avoided in the online phase. This is the basic charac-
teristic of online/oine schemes. In this way, online/oine
schemes are particularly useful for low-power devices such
as smartcard or wireless sensor applications. Those heavy
computations are done in the oine phase which can be car-
ried out by other powerful devices, or even pre-computed by
the manufacturers in the setup stage.
In parallel to online/oine signatures [15, 11, 6, 10], the rst
online/oine encryption scheme was proposed by Guo, Mu
and Chen [9]. Similar to online/oine signature schemes, all
heavy computations are done in the oine phase, without
knowing the message to be encrypted. In the online phase,
only light computations are executed with the knowledge of
the plaintext. Nevertheless, there is a slight dierence in the
denition between online/oine signature and encryption
schemes. Let us take a look on the following example. If we
split the encryption process in the same way as the signing
process, it is trivial to separate some standard encryption,
such as ElGamal encryption scheme. In an ElGamal encryp-
tion scheme, the sender rst computes c1 = g
r; c01 = y
r for
some randomly generated r where y is the public key of the
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receiver. This can be considered as the oine phase, as the
message is still yet unknown. After knowing the message,
the sender computes c2 = m c01. As this part only requires a
multiplication, it can be considered as the online part. The
ciphertext is (c1; c2). However, it is only suitable for the sit-
uation where the sender knows the recipient of the encrypted
message in the oine phase, since the oine phase requires
the knowledge of the public key of the recipient. We are not
interested in this scenario. Instead, we consider a notion
that allows the knowledge of the recipient is yet unknown in
the oine phase. [9] uses this denition for their scheme, in
the context of identity-based encryption.
The above online/oine encryption (where the knowledge of
the recipient is unknown in the oine phase) seems useful
in many scenarios. However, it may not be practical enough
to be used in WSN. As the oine information cannot be
re-used, to encrypt every message one needs to execute the
oine encryption process once. For example, if a sensor
node needs to send 1000 encrypted data to the base station
during its lifetime, it needs to store 1000 pieces of oine
information rst. Due to limited storage capacity inside a
sensor node, it may not be practical. We call such encryption
as message-bounded online/oine encryption (or OOIBE for
short).
Stateful Public key Encryption. Bellare et al. [2] pro-
posed a method to signicantly speed-up the public key en-
cryption (PKE) by simply allowing a sender to maintain
a \state" that is re-used across dierent encryptions. This
new type of PKE is called stateful PKE. This can greatly
reduce the computation cost for the sender if it wants to en-
crypt messages many times. Moreover, if the sender stores
some more information with respect to the receiver's pub-
lic key, it may not need any more exponential computation
for encrypting to this receiver. As an ecient construction,
Bellare et al. presented a stateful PKE scheme based on the
Die-Hellman assumption. Stateful encryption can be used
in WSNs [1] to reduce the computation cost of sensor nodes,
compared with normal public key encryption.
Although stateful public key encryption reduces the compu-
tation cost a lot, the encrypter still needs to perform heavy
computation at least once for each receiver. That limits the
exibility of its usage. In WSN environment, sometimes a
sensor node may need to send data to dierent recipients,
say, dierent base stations. Thus stateful public key encryp-
tion is not yet a perfect solution.
Identity-Based Cryptosystem. Identity-Based (ID-Based)
Cryptosystem, introduced by Shamir [14], eliminates the ne-
cessity for checking the validity of certicates in traditional
public key infrastructure (PKI). In an ID-based cryptosys-
tem, public key of each user is easily computable from an
arbitrary string corresponding to this user's identity (e.g. an
email address, a telephone number, etc.). Using its master
key, a private key generator (PKG) then computes a private
key for each user. This property avoids the requirement of
using certicates and associates implicitly a public key (i.e.
user identity) to each user within the system. One only
needs to know the recipient's identity in order to send an
encrypted message to him. It avoids the complicated and
costly certicate (chain) verication for the authentication
purpose. In contrast, the traditional PKI needs an addi-
tional certication verication process, which is equivalent
to the computation of two signature verications. Identity-
based system is particularly suitable for power constrained
devices such as sensor nodes or smartcards. The absence of
certicate eliminates the costly certicate verication pro-
cess. In addition, when there is a new node added to the
network, other nodes do not need to have its certicate ver-
ied in order to communicate in a secure and authenticated
way. This can greatly reduce communication overhead and
computation cost.
Both two message-bounded online/oine encryption schemes
proposed by [9] are in identity-based setting. The rst scheme
requires 7 pairing operations in the decryption stage. It is
proven secure in the selective-ID model. While for the sec-
ond scheme, it is secure in the full security model, though
the ciphertext is very large (more than 4700 bits). Recently
Liu and Zhou [12] proposed another ecient OOIBE scheme.
The ciphertext is just 1248 bits. However, their scheme can
be only proven secure in the random oracle model. For state-
ful public key encryption, there is only one identity-based
solution [13] which is also proven secure in the random ora-
cle model only.
1.1 Receiver-BoundedOnline/Offline Identity-
Based Encryption
Receiver-Bounded Online/Oine Identity-Based Encryption
(RB-OOIBE) is a practical encryption solution on wireless
sensor nodes. It allows a sensor node to encrypt data with
low computation power and low precomputation storage. Briey,
the data sender prepares a small number of oine cipher-
texts rst, say, n. Since computing oine ciphertexts doesn't
require the receiver's identity, it can be executed in the man-
ufacturing stage. Then the data sender can enjoy light en-
cryption process on unlimited messages for up to n receivers.
In other words, as long as there are less than n receivers, the
data sender can avoid all heavy computations.
RB-OOIBE gets rid of the shortcomings of online/oine and
stateful encryption. Unlike message-bounded online/oine
encryption, it doesn't need to prepare a large amount of
oine ciphertexts (one for each encryption). An oine ci-
phertext is dedicated to a receiver instead of a message to
be encrypted. Unlike stateful encryption, the sender of RB-
OOIBE doesn't need any heavy computation when he en-
crypts messages for up to n dierent receivers.
RB-OOIBE is most suitable for WSNs. In the WSN en-
vironment, sensitive data are collected and encrypted by a
low-power and low-storage sensor node, and then are sent
back to one of several connected base stations. In general,
lots of sensing data will be sent to the same base station (re-
ceiver). The sensor node may store up to n pieces of oine
part information in the manufacturing stage, so that it can
send unlimited encrypted data to n dierent base stations
without any further heavy computation, while these base
station identities can be unknown to the manufacturer.
Compared with hybrid cryptosystems. A hybrid cryp-
tosystem consists of a public key (or identity-based) cryp-
tosystem and a symmetric key cryptosystem. The sender
rst encrypts a symmetric key using the receiver's public key
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(or identity) and sends it to the receiver so that they can
communicate with each other via the symmetric key cryp-
tosystem. We can see that using hybrid cryptosystems, the
sender has to perform a full public key encryption procedure
before communicating to each receiver. Even the sender uses
OOIBE to encrypt messages, the receiver is not stateless {
it has to keep a key for each sender. Therefore, hybrid cryp-
tosystems are not suitable for a large scale network where 1)
a low-power device has to send data to multiple recipients;
2) a stateless device has to receive data from many other
parties.
1.2 Contribution
In this paper, we propose a new notion of Receiver-Bounded
Online/Oine Identity-Based Encryption (RB-OOIBE). We
provide an ecient construction which can be proven selective-
ID CCA secure in the standard model. The advantage of
our schemes over previous OOIBE schemes is very clear if a
sender sends multiple messages to one recipient. Our scheme
re-uses most of the previous information including the oine
pre-computed data. Only a small oine ciphertext has to
be stored on the sensor node. In contrast, other OOIBE
schemes require a number of oine information which is
proportional to the number of messages to be encrypted.
The dierence is signicant if there are lots of messages to
be sent by a sender.
Even for encrypting one message, our scheme is more e-
cient than all OOIBE schemes in the literature. There were
only three schemes proposed: two of them were proposed by
Guo, Mu and Chen in [9]. We use GMC-1 and GMC-2 to de-
note them respectively. The remaining scheme was proposed
by Liu and Zhou [12]. We use LZ to denote it. When com-
pared to GMC-1 (selective-ID security) and GMC-2 (full se-
curity), our scheme enjoys over 50% improvement in storage
cost and ciphertext size. Even if we compare our schemes
with LZ (which is proven secure only in the random ora-
cle model), our scheme also gains eciency improvement in
storage cost and online computation cost.
Note that we don't need to care about selective-ID security
here. Usually, there are at most hundreds of base stations
in a wireless sensor network. That means we only need hun-
dreds of identities in the system. The simulator can guess
the attacking identity in advance, and this will not loosen
the security reduction too much in practice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Some mathe-
matical and security denitions are presented in Section 2.
Our proposed scheme is given in Section 3. In Section 4 we
give a performance comparison with previous schemes and
we conclude the paper in Section 5.
2. DEFINITION
In this section we briey describe the assumptions and def-
initions of our construction.
2.1 Bilinear Group
Let G and GT be two cyclic groups of prime order p. Let
e : GG! GT be a map with the following properties:
 Bilinear: for all g1; g2 2 G and a; b 2 Z, e(ga1 ; gb2) =
e(g1; g2)
ab.
 Non-degenerate: for some g 2 G, e(g; g) 6= 1.
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operations in
G and GT , and the bilinear map are eciently computable.
2.2 Complexity Assumption
Our construction is based on the decision Bilinear Die-
Hellman (BDH) assumption [5, 3]. the decision BDH prob-
lem in G is that given a tuple g; ga; gb; gc 2 G and an element
Z 2 GT , decide if Z = e(g; g)abc.
Denition 1. The decision BDH assumption holds in G if
no polynomial time algorithm A has non-negligible advan-
tage in solving the Decisional BDH problem. More precisely,
we dene the advantage of A in distinguishing two distribu-
tions as
AdvBDHA;G () = jPr[A(1; g; ga; gb; gc; e(g; g)abc) = 1]
 Pr[A(1; g; ga; gb; gc; R) = 1]j;
where R 2R GT and the size of group G depends on the
security parameter . The decision BDH assumption holds
in G if AdvBDHG () = maxAfAdvBDHA;G ()g is negligible for
any adversary A.
2.3 Building Block
We introduce three building blocks used in our schemes:
 an IND-CCA secure symmetric encryption scheme.
The IND-CCA security of a symmetric encryption scheme
SE=(SEnc, SDec) with key length k is captured by
dening the advantage of an adversary A as
AdvCCAA;SE() = 2  Pr[0 =  : K 2R f0; 1gk;
 2R f0; 1g;0  ASEncK ;SDecK ;ChalK; (1)]  1:
In the above, ChalK;(m0;m1) returns SEncK(m).
Moreover, A is allowed to issue only one query to
the Chal oracle, and is not allowed to query SDecK
on the ciphertext returned by it. The symmetric en-
cryption scheme is IND-CCA secure if AdvCCASE () =
maxAfAdvCCAA;SE()g is negligible for any adversary A.
 a collision-resistant hash function.
A hash function H : f0; 1g ! Zp is collision-resistant
if no polynomial time adversary A has non-negligible
advantage in nding collisions on it. More precisely,
we dene the advantage of A as
AdvCOLA;H () = Pr[H(x1) = H(x2) ^ x1 6= x2 :
(x1; x2) A(1)];
where the size of group Zp depends on the security
parameter . The hash function is collision-resistent if
AdvCOLH () = maxAfAdvCOLA;H ()g is negligible for any
adversary A.
 a secure key derivation function.
A key derivation function D : GT ! f0; 1gk on a ran-
dom input outputs a k-bit string which is computation-
ally indistinguishable from a random string. We dene
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the advantage of an adversary A in distinguishing two
distributions as
AdvKDFA;D () = Pr[A(1; D(x)) = 1]  Pr[A(1; r) = 1]
where x 2 GT ; r 2R f0; 1gk and  is the security pa-
rameter determining k. So the key derivation function
is KDF-secure if AdvKDFD () = maxAfAdvKDFA;D ()g is
negligible for any adversary A.
2.4 Receiver-BoundedOnline/Offline Identity-
Based Encryption
A receiver-bounded online/oine identity-based encryption
(RB-OOIBE) scheme consists of the following algorithms:
 Setup(1): on input the security parameter 1, out-
put the public key param and master secret key MK.
 KeyGen(param;MK; id): on input the public pa-
rameter param, the master secret key MK and an
identity id, output the secret key skid.
 O-Encrypt(param; st): on input the public param-
eter param and a state table st, output the updated
state table st.
 On-Encrypt(param; id;m; st): on input the public
parameter param, an identity id, a message m and a
state table st, output the ciphertext C and the (up-
dated) state table st, or `?'.
 Decrypt(param; skid; C): on input the public param-
eter param, the secret key skid, a ciphertext C, output
the plaintext m or `?'.
Note that the oine encryption should be performed by
powerful devices in the oine phase. In the online phase,
one can arbitrarily choose a pre-computed oine ciphertext
from the state table and employ it in the online encryption.
One oine ciphertext can be dedicated to one recipient only.
The encrypter should maintain the state table for recording
the usage of oine ciphertexts.
Now we dene the CCA security for RB-OOIBE.
Denition 2. The chosen-ciphertext security of an RB-
OOIBE scheme is dened by the following game with secu-
rity parameter  between an adversary A and a challenger.
1. Setup. Perform Setup(1) to get (param;MK) and
give param to A.
2. Query phase 1. A may issue queries to the following
oracles.
(a) Extract(id): return
skid  KeyGen(param;MK; id).
(b) Encrypt(id;m): return the ciphertext C where
(C; st)  On-Encrypt(param; id;m; st) , st  
O-Encrypt(param; st) and st is the initially
empty state table.
(c) Decrypt(id; C): return
m  Decrypt(param; skid; C), where skid  
KeyGen(param;MK; id).
3. Challenge. A presents (m0;m1). Return the challenge
ciphertext C to A where
(C; st) On-Encrypt(param; id;m ; st);  2R f0; 1g
and st O-Encrypt(param; st).
4. Query phase 2. A continues making queries as in Query
phase 1, except that A can't issue C to the decryption
oracle.
5. Guess. A outputs the guess 0 2 f0; 1g. We say A wins
the game if 0 = .
The advantage ofA for a scheme  is dened as AdvCCAA; () =
jPr[0 = ]   1
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j. An RB-OOIBE scheme is IND-ID-CCA-
secure if AdvCCA () = maxAfAdvCCAA; ()g is negligible for
any adversary A.
We also dene a weaker model: selective-ID CCA security
(IND-sID-CCA). The selective-ID security is dened in the
same way as full CCA security except that A has to decide
which id it wants to attack in the beginning of the game.
As described before, the selective-ID is not so weak in case
only hundreds of identities are used.
Note that our construction and all previous OOIBE schemes
have to trust the oine ciphertext generator. That is, the
ciphertexts sent by the sensor nodes can be always decrypted
by the owner of them.
3. CONSTRUCTION
We introduce our main scheme  in this section. The scheme
is based on Boneh and Boyen's IBE [3].
 Setup(1). Randomly generate a prime p, two groups
G;GT of order p, a bilinear map e and generators
g; g2; h1; h2 2 G. Compute g1 = g where  2R Zp.
Choose a key derivation function D : GT ! f0; 1gk,
where k is the block size of a symmetric key encryption
SE=(SEnc,SDec), and a hash function H : f0; 1g !
Zp. Output the public parameter and master secret
key:
param = (g; g1; g2; h1; h2; H;D); MK = :
 KeyGen(param;MK; id). Pick a random value r 2
Zp. Compute the secret key for id as
skid = (g

2 (g
id
1 h1)
r; gr):
 O-Encrypt(param; st). Randomly choose s; a^; b^; c^ 2R
Zp and compute
(c1; c2; c3; c4; c5) = (e(g1; g2)
s; gs; (ga^1h1)
s; (gb^1h2)
s; gc^s1 )
and K = D(c1). Let C
0 = (K; c2; c3; c4; c5; a^; b^; c^ 1) be
an oine ciphertext. Append (; C0) to st.
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 On-Encrypt(param; id;m; st). Get C0 from the en-
try (id; C0) 2 st. If there exists no such C0, ran-
domly pick an entry (; C0) from st and replace it with
(id; C0). If there is no free entry (; C0) on st, return
`?'. Let C0 = (K; c2; c3; c4; c5; a^; b^; c^ 1). Compute
~c1 = SEncK(m); t1 = c^
 1(id a^) and t2 = c^ 1( b^);
where  = H(c2; c3; c4; c5; t1). Output the nal cipher-
text
C = (~c1; c2; c3; c4; c5; t1; t2)
= (SEncK(m); g
s; (ga^1h1)
s; (gb^1h2)
s; gc^s1 ;
c^ 1(id  a^); c^ 1(   b^))
and the updated state table st.
 Decrypt(Param; skid; C). Let C = (~c1; c2; c3; c4; c5; t1; t2)
and skid = (d1; d2). Compute  = H(c2; c3; c4; c5; t1).
Check that
e(c4c
t2
5 ; g)
?
= e(c2; g

1 h2):
If the equation holds, output `?'. Otherwise, compute
c1 = e(c2; d1)=e(c3c
t1
5 ; d2) and K = D(c1):
Output the message
m = SDecK(~c1):
3.1 Security
We prove that the scheme is IND-sID-CCA secure.
Theorem 1. Our scheme  is IND-sID-CCA-secure as-
suming the decision BDH assumption holds in G, the sym-
metric encryption scheme SE=(SEnc,SDec) with block size k
is IND-CCA secure, the hash functionH is collision-resistant
and the key derivation function D : GT ! f0; 1gk is secure.
More precisely, we have
AdvCCA2 ()  AdvDDHG () + AdvCCASE () + AdvKDFD ()
+AdvCOLH () +
qD
p
where  is the security parameter and qD is the maximum
number of queries to the decryption oracle.
Proof. Suppose there is an adversary A breaking  with
non-negligible advantage. Given a random decision BDH
instance (g; ga; gb; gc; Z), where Z is either e(g; g)abc or a
random element of GT , we construct another algorithm B
breaking the decision BDH as follows.
 Init. A chooses an identity id 2 Zp that it intends
to attack.
 Setup. B sets g1 = ga, g2 = gb and g3 = gc and
chooses a hash function H : f0; 1g ! Zp and a key
derivation function D : GT ! f0; 1gk. It then picks
random values 1; 2 2 Zp and denes h1 = g id1 g1
and h2 = g
 
1 g
2 , where  = H(g3; g
1
3 g
 k1;idk3;id ,
g23 g
 k2;idk3;id ; gk3;id ; k1;id) and k1;id ; k2;id ; k3;id
2R Zp. The parameter (g; g1; g2; h1; h2;H;D) is then
sent to A. Since g; g1; g2 are randomly chosen, and
h1; h2 are uniformly random, the distribution of the
parameter is identical to that in the actual construc-
tion.
 Query Phase 1. B answers the following queries.
1. Extract(id): for any id 6= id, B chooses a ran-
dom value r 2 Zp and sets the private key for id
as
skid = (d1; d2) = (g
 1
id id
2 (g
id
1 h1)
r; g
 1
id id
2 g
r):
Let ~r = r   b=(id  id), we can see that
d1 = g
 1
id id
2 (g
id
1 h1)
r = g
 1
id id
2 (g
id id
1 g
1)r
= ga2 (g
id id
1 g
1)
r  b
id id = ga2 (g
id
1 h1)
~r;
d2 = g
 1
id id
2 g
r = g
r  b
id id = g~r:
Since ~r is uniform in Zp, the key is correctly dis-
tributed.
2. Encrypt(id;m): for id 6= id, B chooses a xed
random value s for id, and computes the cipher-
text as in the actual construction. For id = id,
B computes the ciphertext as
~c1 = SEncK(m); c2 = g3; c3 = g
1
3 g
 k1;idk3;id ;
c4 = g
2
3 g
 k2;idk3;id ; c5 = g
k3;id ;
t1 = k1;id ; t2 = k2;id ;
where k1;id ; k2;id ; k3;id are chosen in Setup phase
andK = D(Z). We can see that if Z = e(g; g)abc =
e(g1; g2)
c, this is a valid encryption of m.
3. Decrypt(id; C): let C = (~c1; c2; c3; c4; c5; t1; t2).
B rst checks the validity of C as in the actual
construction. If C doesn't pass the equation, B
responses `?'. Otherwise, for id 6= id, B gen-
erates id's secret key as in Extract oracle, and
then decrypts C. For id = id, B rst computes
 = H(c2; c3; c4; c5; t1). Consider the following
case:
{  6= : B computes the private key for (id; )
as
(d1; d2; d3)
= (g
 2
 
2 g
1r1(g 

1 g
2)r2 ; gr1 ; g
 1
 
2 g
r2);
where r1; r2 2R Zp. We can see that when
~r2 = r2  b=( ), the private key is of the
form:
d1 = g
 2
 
2 g
1r1(g 

1 g
2)r2
= ga2g
1r1(g 

1 g
2)
r2  b 
= ga2 (g
id
1 h1)
r1(g1 h2)
~r2 ;
d2 = g
r1 ; d3 = g
~r2
which is valid. Then B computes
c1 = e(c2; d1)=(e(c3c
t1
5 ; d2)e(c4c
t2
5 ; d3))
and
K = D(c1);
and outputs the message m = SDecK(~c1).
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{  = : B computes K = D(Z) and out-
puts the message m = SDecK(~c1). We can
see that if Z = e(g; g)abc = e(g1; g2)
c, m is
correctly decrypted.
 Challenge. A outputs two messages m0 and m1. B
randomly chooses a bit  and encrypts m under id

as in Encrypt oracle.
 Query Phase 2. A makes key extraction, encryption
and decryption queries, and B responds as in Query
Phase 1.
 Guess. A outputs its guess 0. If 0 = , B outputs
0; otherwise, B outputs 1.
Analysis. Now we analyze the advantage of B in the above
game. If Z = e(g; g)abc, we have
Pr[B(1; g; ga; gb; gc; e(g; g)abc) = 1] = Pr[0 = ]: (1)
We can see that all values responded by B for Extract and
Encrypt queries have identical distribution to that in the
actual construction. For Decrypt queries, if id 6= id, B
just answers as in the actual construction. If id = id but
 6= , we have showed that the decryption key is in the
right form and thus B's responses have right distribution.
If id = id and  = , it means that (c2; c3; c4; c5; t1) is
given by B except a negligible probability. So K = D(Z) =
D(e(g; g)abc) = D(e(g1; g2)
c) is the correct key for ~c1. B
successfully simulates the game. Equation (1) holds.
Then we consider the case for Z = R 2R GT . We have
Pr[B(1; g; ga; gb; gc; R) = 1] 
1
2
+ AdvCCASE () + Adv
KDF
D () + Adv
COL
H () +
qD
p
:
(2)
We rst dene RejInv as an event that the decryption oracle
rejects all invalid ciphertexts. The following equation holds.
Pr[0 = jRejInv]  1
2
+ AdvCCASE () + Adv
KDF
D (): (3)
We can see that if the decryption oracle rejects all invalid
ciphertexts, the distribution of  is independent from A's
view under the assumption that SE is CCA-secure and D is
KDF-secure. Moreover, we have the following equation.
Pr[:RejInv]  AdvCOLH () + qD
p
: (4)
If an invalid ciphertext C = (~c1; c2; c3; c4; c5; t1; t2) passes
the checking equation in Decrypt, A either
 nds collisions of H, or
 adjusts one of the values c2; c4; c5 and t1 so that the
equation holds.
The probability that the former happens is bounded by the
collision-resistent hash function H, where the probability
that the latter happens is 1=p. Considering that there are
qD decryption queries, Equation (4) holds.
Now from (3) and (4), we get Equation (2):
Pr[0 = ]
= Pr[0 = jRejInv] Pr[RejInv]
+Pr[0 = j:RejInv] Pr[:RejInv]
 Pr[0 = jRejInv] + Pr[:RejInv]
 1
2
+ AdvCCASE () + Adv
KDF
D () + Adv
COL
H () +
qD
p
Then by subtracting (1) from (2), we get the bound in the
theorem statement.
4. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
There are only 3 existing online/oine IBE schemes, two
of them are proposed by Guo, Mu and Chen in [9] and one
of them is proposed by Liu and Zhou [12]. We use GMC-
1, GMC-2 and LZ to denote them respectively. We also
assume that jGj = 160 bits, jqj = 160 bits, jGT j = 1024
bits and message space is 128 bits for the following compari-
son. Assume AES is used for the symmetric key encryption,
where both the key size and ciphertext size are 128 bits. In
order to make it CCA secure, we use another MAC func-
tion which adds further 80 bits to the ciphertext. For the
online/oine signature scheme used in GMC-1, we adopt
Boneh and Boyen's [4] construction which requires 320-bit
oine, 320-bit online signatures and 320-bit public/private
keys (by assuming some group elements can be shared be-
tween dierent keys).
Table 1 shows the comparison between our scheme and other
OOIBE schemes, in the case of encrypting one single mes-
sage. The dierences can be summarized as follow:
1. When compared to the scheme in the full security
model (GMC-2), both the oine storage and cipher-
text size of our scheme are 4 times smaller than GMC-
2. Again, as described before, selective-ID security is
not really weak in our scenario.
2. When compared to the scheme in selective-ID model
(GMC-1), both the oine storage and ciphertext size
of our scheme are 2 times smaller than GMC-1. Even
if we compare to the random oracle scheme (LZ), our
scheme still achieves a smaller oine storage (2 times
smaller).
3. In terms of computation requirement, we do not re-
quire any point addition operation (M operation) in
the online encryption stage for both schemes. Mod-
ular computation (mc operation) and symmetric key
encryption (SE operation) are much faster than M
operation. Thus the online encryption stages of our
scheme is faster than GMC-1 and GMC-2.
4. We also note that schemes in the random oracle are
usually more ecient than those in the standard model,
due to the weaken security level. However, our scheme
achieves similar or even outstanding performance over
the random oracle scheme (LZ).
Figure 1 shows another comparison on oine storage. In
this case, there are a number of messages to be sent to one
receiver. It is very common in WSN for a sensor to send
multiple messages to a base station. Since the oine compu-
tation and oine storage are independent of the number of
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GMC-1 GMC-2 LZ Ours
Oine 6E + 2ME 4E + 2ME 4E + 1ME 3E + 2ME
computation
Online 1M + 2mc 1M + 2mc 3mc 2mc + SE
computation
Oine storage 2944 5056 2624 1248
(bits)
Ciphertext length 2784 4736 1248 1168
(bits)
Number of pairing 7 2 2 4
for decryption
Security model selective-ID full random oracle selective-ID
Table 1: Comparison of computation cost and size for encrypting one message. E: point multiplication in G
or exponentiation in GT ; ME: multi-point multiplication in G (which costs about 1.3 times more than a single
point multiplication); M : multiplication in GT ; mc: modular computation in Zp; and SE: the symmetric key
encryption.
Figure 1: Oine storage size for dierent numbers
of messages to be sent
messages to be encrypted in our schemes, the eciency gain
can be magnied when more messages will be sent, say, 100
messages. So when the number of receivers is limited, our
schemes can achieve much better performance when com-
pared to previous OOIBE schemes.
Again, even for encrypting one message, our scheme is more
ecient than all OOIBE schemes in the literature. Therefore
using RB-OOIBE to encrypt messages directly is better than
using OOIBE schemes to encrypt a symmetric key and then
using this symmetric key to encrypt messages.
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a new notion called Receiver-
Bounded Online/Oine ID-based Encryption. We also pre-
sented a concrete RB-OOIBE construction. The eciency
improvements of our scheme over previous schemes are very
clear, especially in the case that many messages are en-
crypted for one receiver. In general, a wireless sensor node
has three main limitations: energy, computation power and
storage. For energy saving, our scheme provides the shortest
ciphertext length compared to other OOIBE schemes. By
the online/oine property, the sensor node doesn't need any
heavy computation for encryption. Most importantly, RB-
OOIBE saves lots of space required for oine ciphertexts.
This makes our scheme really practical for wireless sensor
nodes.
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